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1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on a neglected aspect of the economy in the explanation of the rise
of European unemployment since the late 1970s; that of state control. We argue that state
control of some sectors of the economy can contribute to the rise in aggregate unemployment
when the economy is hit by increased turbulence, where “turbulence” is interpreted as
the variability in the occurrence and strength of a variety of possible shocks to the world
economy. The mechanism by which this takes place is the following. In an economy with
two sectors, a private one that cannot fully insure workers against turbulence and a state
one that can insure them, workers will prefer to wait for a job in the state sector, rather
than accept a job immediately in the private sector. We show that this mechanism has as a
consequence the fact that when the economy is hit by shocks with more variance, aggregate
unemployment will be higher, on average, than in an economy where shocks have less
variance. We follow Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998) in claiming that the European economy
has been subjected to significant increases in turbulence since the late 1970s. According
to our model, such increases in turbulence should lead to higher average unemployment in
economies that have a larger public sector. We gather empirical evidence that supports this
prediction.
The existing literature on the rise of European unemployment has focused mainly on
the role of labor market institutions in explaining the European unemployment experience
and its diﬀerences from that of the U.S. experience.1 Our methodology is similar to that
of the works cited, to the extent that we focus on the interaction between the turbulence
shock and the institution of public ownership, but we do not model other labor market
institutions.2 Our work is more closely related to recent empirical work that considers the
importance of regulation in product markets and of public ownership in explaining cross-
country diﬀerences in employment outcomes (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2001)), and
in private investment and growth (Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2003)).
We develop a simple two-sector model that has risk-averse workers directing their search
into one of the sectors. There is a fixed cost to creating a vacancy in each sector. In the
benchmark economy, both sectors are private and firms are free to create vacancies. In
the European economy, Sector 1 is a public sector and only the government can create
1See Bruno and Sachs (1985), Layard et al (1991), Phelphs (1994), Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000).
2For other models along these lines, see Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola and Ichino (1996), Bertola
and Rogerson (1997), and Mortenson and Pissarides (1999a and 1999b) for mechanisms emphasizing demand
side factors, and Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), and Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998) for supply side mechanisms.
2
vacancies. In each sector, workers and vacancies are matched randomly. The output of a
match is subject to match-specific productivity shocks. Workers and firms share ex post
the output in a private match, but the wage is set by the government in the public sector.
The key results in our model hinge on the following mechanisms: (1) the worker’s choice
of the sector in which to search for a job depends on both the expected volatility of wages
oﬀered and the probability of getting a job; (2) the government can provide more insurance
against match-specific shocks than private firms; and (3) the government can influence the
incentives that firms have to enter the private sector by influencing the number of job
searchers who enter the public sector, for example, by opening up vacancies or increasing
wages. We show that the presence of the public sector in the European economy may
entail higher aggregate unemployment than in the benchmark economy. We investigate
the implication of a mean-preserving spread of the match-specific shock in our economy.
We find that in equilibrium there will be higher unemployment in the European economy
following an increase in turbulence, because workers will be queueing for public sector jobs,
which oﬀer less risky wage profiles.
Our results are related to an older literature that studies how the presence of a unionized
sector in the economy, which oﬀers “safer” jobs, may generate high and persistent unem-
ployment, because workers queue for such “protected” jobs. In our model the government
plays a similar role to that played by the union in this literature (see the discussion in Hall
(1975)). More recently, Rodrik (1997) has emphasized the role of the public sector as an
insurance mechanism against household income and consumption risk in countries that face
a relatively large and undiversifiable external risk.
Our model is complementary to recent papers that study the interaction of state and
private ownership. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a model that studies the in-
terconnection between labor market institutions and the state’s regulatory intervention on
the production side of the economy. Our paper contributes to this literature by providing
insights into one possible mechanism through which the presence of an active government
in an economy may aﬀect its labor market performance. Finally, Algan, Cahuc, and Zylber-
berg (2002) show that public employment crowds out total employment in those countries
where goods produced in the public sector are substitutes for goods produced in the private
sector. This finding is consistent with ours, because the goods produced by the two sectors
are substitutes in the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
describes its principal implications. Finally, Section 4 presents some empirical evidence in
favor of the mechanism that we describe.
3
2 Model
We consider a two-sector economy that is populated by four types of agent: workers, capi-
talists, firms and a government. Each firm operates in one of the two sectors, 1 and 2, and
produces respectively the only two consumption goods, 1 and 2. Firms are risk neutral,
and have identical production technologies, each requiring exactly one unit of capital and
one worker. The output of a firm is independently and identically distributed. In all
sectors, capital is rent from capitalists at a fixed exogenous price. In our economy, which
we term Europe, the two sectors diﬀer with respect to their ownership: the first sector is
public, while the second is private.
There are two diﬀerences between the public and private sectors. (1) In the private
sector, a worker is paid an exogenous fraction of the output’s value. In the public sector,
his wage is set by the government. (2) In the private sector, the number, or mass, of firms
is such that the expected profit is zero. In the public sector, the mass of firms is set by the
government.
There is a unit mass of workers in the economy. Workers and firms that have rent capital
meet simultaneously according to a matching technology that we assume is homogenous
of degree one. The search is directed. Workers are risk-averse and choose whether,
and where, to search to maximize their expected utility as consumers. In both sectors,
unemployed workers, that is, workers that remain unmatched, are entitled to benefits set
by the government. Moreover, both labor and capital incomes, including unemployment
benefits, are taxed at an identical rate fixed by the government. Net labor and capital
income are spent by consumers (workers and capitalists) on the two goods. Prices clear
the goods markets.
In the European economy, the government controls the unemployment benefits, the tax
rate, the measure of public firms, the wage paid to its employees, and the price at which
it sells its output. Its revenues consist of tax, and sales of Good 1, and its expenditures
consist of capital expenditure as well as unemployment benefits and wages paid in the public
sector.
We compare our European economy to a benchmark economy in which both sectors of
production are private (we will also refer to the latter as to the “all-private” economy).
Since Sector 1 is private in the benchmark economy, the government controls only the
unemployment benefits and the tax rate: its revenues consist of tax, and its expenditures
consist of unemployment benefits. Notice that we are comparing two economies that diﬀer
only in their ownership structure; their other fundamentals are identical.
We begin our analysis by solving for the equilibrium of the economy. The equilibrium
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for our European economy is a list of functions that satisfies the following conditions: (1)
labor indiﬀerence; (2) goods market clearing; (3) the free entry condition for Sector 2, and
(4) the government’s budget is balanced. The labor indiﬀerence condition states that in
equilibrium workers are indiﬀerent between searching in either of the two sectors. The free
entry condition states that the mass of private firms in the private sector (Sector 2) is such
that expected profits are zero. An optimum is a subset of equilibria in which the expected
utility level of the representative worker is maximized. A similar definition applies to the
benchmark economy. However, in that case, there is one additional constraint that must
be satisfied: the free entry condition must also hold for Sector 1 in the benchmark economy,
because both sectors are privately run in this case.
In what follows we lay out the specification of the model and equilibrium conditions
for the particular example developed in later sections. First, we analyze the equilibrium
for the benchmark economy and for the European economy. Note that, for the latter, the
set of government policies includes the measure of firms operating in the public sector, the
wage paid in public sector jobs, and the relative price of Good 1. We emphasize how these
additional tools that the government has in the public sector (Sector 1) aﬀect the economy’s
employment performance, the share of public employment and the size of the private sector.
Finally, in the second part of section 2.1 we turn to the analysis of the optimal government
policy. A more general analysis of the optimum is carried out in the appendix, where we
show that our results hold for a generic utility function U : R2++ → R that is smooth, jointly
strictly concave and strictly increasing in both terms. In the exposition we use superscript
B for the benchmark, “all private,” economy, and superscript E for Europe (the partially
public economy). Subscript i = 1, 2 will refer to the corresponding good or sector.
2.1 Model Specification and Equilibrium Conditions
Let ui be the measure of workers searching in Sector i and vi be the measure of vacancies
posted in Sector i. Since there is a unit mass of workers in the economy it follows that
u1 + u2 5 1. This condition will hold with equality if all workers search for a job. The
number of matches in Sector i is determined by a matching function,Mi =M (ui, vi) , which
is increasing in both u and v, concave and homogeneous of degree one. We assume the
matching function to be identical across sectors and, following the literature in this area,
we use a Cobb-Douglas specification, that is: Mi = Auγi v
1−γ
i where γ ∈ (0, 1) and A is
a scale parameter that is positive and small enough to guarantee that the probabilities of
being matched, both for workers and for firms, are between zero and 1. We denote the
probability that a worker searching in Sector i gets a job by φ (θi) ≡ M(ui,vi)ui = Aθ
1−γ
i where
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we denote by θi ≡ viui the market tightness in Sector i. The measure of total employment
in each economy is denoted by E =M1 +M2.
The output of a match is subject to an idiosyncratic shock that is i.i.d. both across
firms and across sectors. We assume that the (random) output of a match Y is distributed
according to a lognormal distribution, that is, Y = ez where z ∼ N(λ, σ2). Hence, the total
output in Sector i = 1, 2 is simply given by Miy, where y = E [ez] = exp (λ+ σ2/2) is the
expected output of a firm.
The wage paid to a worker is denoted by wj , where the subscript j = 0, 1, 2 refers to
the worker’s status. A worker receives wage w0 if unemployed, and wage w1 and w2 if he
works in Sector 1 or 2, respectively. In the public sector workers are paid a constant wage.
In the private sector workers are paid a share α ∈ (0, 1) of the realized output, that is, the
private sector wage is risky.
Consumers consists of workers and capitalists. The income of the capitalists is given
by the total payment made by firms in both sectors. That is, their income is given by
R (v1 + v2) where R is the cost of opening a vacancy. We assume that both types of con-
sumer are characterized by the same preferences over consumption. We assume a constant
relative risk aversion utility function with a unitary elasticity of substitution between the
two goods. Hence, the consumer’s problem is to maximize
U(c1, c2) =
³
cβ1 c
1−β
2
´1−r
− 1
1− r ,
by choosing (c1, c2) subject to
pc1 + c2 ≤ (1− τ)ω,
where ci, i = 1, 2 is the quantity of Good i he consumes, τ is the proportional tax rate, p
is the relative price of Good 1 with respect to Good 2, and ω is a consumer’s gross income
(ω = wj j = 0, 1, 2 for workers, and ω = R (v1 + v2) for capitalists). The parameter β
belongs to the open unit interval, and r ≥ 0 represents the coeﬃcient of risk aversion (note
that for r = 1 the utility function reduces to ln
³
cβ1 c
1−β
2
´
). Under this specification the
Walrasian demand functions, ci ((1− τ)ω, p) for i = 1, 2, are linear for consumers’ income.
We denote the corresponding indirect utility function by V ((1− τ)ω, p).
In equilibrium both markets clear, that is for i = 1, 2 :
Mipiy = M1E [ci ((1− τ)w1, p)] +M2Eci (w2 (1− τ) , p) + (MC)
(1−M1 −M2)E [ci ((1− τ)w0, p)] + ci ((1− τ)R(v1 + v2), p)
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We now turn to the workers’ search decision. In our model there are two sources of
uncertainty in the worker’s choice of the sector in which to search for a job. That is, he
faces both employment risk, in that he may or may not find a job, and “wage” risk, since
in the private sector he will be paid a share α of the realized output. Hence, his choice
depends on both the wage oﬀered and the probability of getting a job in each sector. A
worker will search for a job in Sector 1 if and only if the expected utility in Sector 1 is larger
than in Sector 2, that is if and only if EU1 ≥ EU2 where:
EUi = φi (θi)EV ((1− τ)wi, p) + (1− φi (θi))V ((1− τ)w0, p) i = 1, 2.
In equilibrium, all workers search for a job and are indiﬀerent between searching in
either sector. This gives us our second equilibrium condition, which we will define as labor
indiﬀerence (hereafter, LI):
EU1 = EU2 ≥ V ((1− τ) b, p) (LI)
The measure of firms in the private sector is determined by free entry; that is, firms will
enter up to the point at which the expected profit of an additional vacancy is equal to zero.
In particular, the free entry condition (hereafter, FE) pins down the market tightness in
each (private sector) i, that is:
φ (θi) θ−1i (1− α)piy = R (FE)
where p1 = p, p2 = 1. This condition needs to hold in Sector 2 for the European economy,
and must also be satisfied in Sector 1 in the benchmark economy.
Finally, the government must balance its budget. The budget-balanced condition for
the benchmark economy is given by:
τ {(pM1 +M2)αy +R(v1 + v2)} = (1− τ)w0(1−M1 −M2)
where government revenues come from (proportional) income taxes on labor and capital
income and its expenditures consist of unemployment benefits. However, in the European
economy the government collects additional revenue from the sale of the good it produces
(Good 1) and faces additional costs, namely the cost of labor w1 and the cost of opening
public sector vacancies Rv1. Hence, the budget-balanced condition for Europe is given by:
τ (M2αy +Rv2) +M1pY = (1− τ) [(1−M1 −M2)w0 +Rv1 +M1w1] .
Before solving the model, let us emphasize its key assumptions. First, the matching
technology is homogeneous of degree one. Second, both the matching and the production
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technologies are the same across sectors. Because of these two assumptions, comparing
unemployment rates across economies reduces to comparing the market tightness between
a publicly-run sector and a privately-run one.
We further assume, in our analysis of the optimum, that the government maximizes the
representative worker’s expected utility, not the capitalist’s. This assumption entails that
the government bears a real cost when it opens a vacancy, because the rental fee is paid to
the capitalists, not the workers.3 However, creating a vacancy in the public sector generates
revenue for the government; namely, the value of the output that it generates. Therefore,
the government faces a familiar trade-oﬀ when deciding how many public vacancies to post.4
2.2 Solving the model
2.2.1 Equilibrium Analysis
In the benchmark economy, the market tightness in each sector is determined by free entry.
Since, by free entry, firms are indiﬀerent between opening a vacancy in either sector, and
workers must be indiﬀerent between searching in either sector, it follows that the equilibrium
price must be one. This follows from the following Lemma. Define θB := [A (1− α) y/R]1/γ .
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, θB1 = θB2 = θB, pB = 1.
Proof: Free entry in both sectors implies that:
pB
φ
¡
θB1
¢
θB1
=
φ
¡
θB2
¢
θB2
.
Since workers are indiﬀerent across sectors, ∀w0,
φ
¡
θB1
¢ £
E
£
V
¡
(1− τ)αpBY, pB
¢¤
− V
¡
(1− τ)w0, pB
¢¤
= φ
¡
θB2
¢ £
E
£
V
¡
(1− τ)αY, pB
¢¤
− V
¡
(1− τ)w0, pB
¢¤
,
where V (w, p) is the consumer’s indirect utility function, given income w and price p, and
E [·] denotes the expectation operator. It follows from this labor indiﬀerence condition, LI,
that pB = 1. Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that θB2 > θB1 . Since φ (θ) /θ is
decreasing in θ, it follows that pB < 1, which implies that:
E
£
V
¡
(1− τ)αpBY, pB
¢¤
−V
¡
(1− τ)w0, pB
¢
< E
£
V
¡
(1− τ)αY, pB
¢¤
−V
¡
(1− τ)w0, pB
¢
.
3 If this were not the case, the government would choose an infinite measure of public firms.
4 It is also worth mentioning here that, by construction, the welfare in the European economy is always
larger than in the benchmark economy. Obviously, we do not view this as a compelling description of reality,
as our model ignores several other aspects of public management (incentives, information processing, etc).
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Since φ (θ) is increasing in θ, this contradicts LI. Assuming θB2 < θB1 leads to a similar
contradiction. Therefore, θB2 = θB1 and thus pB = 1. From free entry, we obtain that
θBi = [A (1− β) y/R]1/γ .¥
In the European economy, the public sector oﬀers three control variables to the gov-
ernment. First, the government chooses the price pE at which to sell its output. Second,
it chooses the wage wE1 that it pays its workforce. Third, it chooses the “size” vE1 of the
public sector.5 Fixing two out of these three variables, it is possible to investigate how
variations in the third aﬀect the equilibrium employment in Europe, EE = ME1 +ME2 ,
the size of the private sector vE2 , and the two measures of the relative size of the public
sector, ME1 /
¡
ME1 +ME2
¢
and vE1 /
¡
vE1 + vE2
¢
. The results are summarized in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium:
1. An increase in vE1 (holding wE1 and pE fixed) leads to an increase in EE, an increase
in vE2 , an increase in vE1 /
¡
vE1 + vE2
¢
, and leaves ME1 /
¡
ME1 +ME2
¢
unchanged.
2. An increase in wE1 (holding vE1 and pE fixed) leaves EE, vE2 , vE1 /
¡
vE1 + vE2
¢
and
ME1 /
¡
ME1 +ME2
¢
unchanged.
3. An increase in pE (holding vE1 and wE1 fixed) leads to a decrease in EE if and only if
A is small enough. It leads to an increase in vE2 , and to a decrease of both vE1 /
¡
vE1 + vE2
¢
and ME1 /
¡
ME1 +ME2
¢
.
Proof : It follows from free entry that, in equilibrium, θE2 = θB. It follows from market
clearing that:
pE =
βφ
¡
θB
¢
1− β
1− uE1
φ
¡
θE1
¢
uE1
.
Employment is given by:
EE =
¡
1− uE1
¢
φ
¡
θB
¢
+ uE1 φ
¡
θE1
¢
=
¡
1− uE1
¢
φ
¡
θB
¢ ·
1 +
β/pE
1− β
¸
.
The same substitution gives:
ME1
ME1 +ME2
=
1
1 + 1−ββ pE
and
vE1
vE1 + vE2
=
1
1 + φ
¡
θB
¢ 1−uE1
uE1
.
5The government also chooses the !!level!! of unemployment benefits, wE0 , and the tax rate, τE . However,
(i) these choice variables are not directly related to the first sector ownership structure per se, (ii) they are
also choice variables in the benchmark economy, and (iii) in equilibrium there are two constraints, labor
indiﬀerence and budget balance that determine these levels, given
¡
vE1 , wE1 , pE
¢
.
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All the conclusions are immediate from these expressions, with the exceptions of the eﬀect
of an increase in pE on EE, and the eﬀect of vE1 on vE1 /
¡
vE1 + vE2
¢
. These results follow
from implicit diﬀerentiation of the corresponding equations.¥
To summarize, increasing the number of vacancies in the public sector increases employ-
ment: since the price is fixed, so is the output ratio, and an increase in the size of the public
sector thus also leads to an increase in the number of vacancies in the private sector. In
turn, this leads to high output, and thus employment, in the economy. Similarly, as the
price and thus the output ratio is fixed, varying the wage oﬀered by the public sector has
no impact on employment. Instead, it leads to an adjustment of unemployment benefit, in
order to preserve the equal desirability of both sectors to the job searcher. The eﬀect of
price variations is more complex.
2.2.2 Optimum Analysis
Since the government is risk-neutral and the workers are risk-averse, it is not surprising
that, at any optimum, the government provides full insurance against unemployment risk
in the benchmark case as well as in the European case. That is, unemployment benefits
equal the certainty equivalent of the (random) wage in the private sector. Moreover, the
wage paid in the public sector, wE1 is also optimally set equal to this certainty equivalent,
as follows from the indiﬀerence of workers across sectors, given the full insurance result. As
these results hold in a more general environment, we refer the reader to the proof provided
in the appendix for the latter case, and simply record them in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 Given τ < 1 and p > 0, definew as the unique solution of:
V ((1− τ)w, p) = E [V ((1− τ)αY, p)] .
Then, at any optimum, wB0 = w, and wE0 = wE1 = w given the corresponding values of τ
and p.
Proof: See the appendix.¥
It is now straightforward to provide a complete characterization of the optimal solution
to the benchmark economy.
Lemma 4 In the benchmark economy, the optimal solution is given by:
θB1 = θB2 = θB, pB = 1,
uB1 = β, τB =
¡
1− φ
¡
θB
¢¢
w¡
1− φ
¡
θB
¢¢
w + φ
¡
θB
¢
y
10
Proof: Since pB = 1, and market clearing requires:
pBMB1
MB2
=
β
1− β ,
it follows that uB1 = β and vB1 = θBβ. Finally, budget balance requires:¡
1− φ
¡
θB
¢¢ ¡
1− τB
¢
wB0 = τBφ
¡
θB
¢
y.
Solving for τB gives the explicit expression for the proportional tax rate.
It is a little more tedious to derive the optimal solution for the European economy,
as the European government is free to choose vE1 and p in such a way as to maximize
the agents’ expected utility. Nevertheless, the following Lemma, along with the previous
Lemmas, provides a complete characterization of the European optimum.
Lemma 5 In the European economy, the optimal solution is given by:
θE1 =
(1− γ)w
γR
, uE1 =
βγ
£
1− φ
¡
θB
¢
+ φ
¡
θB
¢
y/w
¤
(1− β) + βγ
£
1− φ
¡
θB
¢
+ φ
¡
θB
¢
y/w
¤ ,
pE =
φ
¡
θB
¢
φ
¡
θE1
¢
γ
¡
1− φ
¡
θB
¢
+ φ
¡
θB
¢
y/w
¢ and τE = 1− φ ¡θB¢
1− φ
¡
θP
¢
+ φ
¡
θB
¢
y/w
.
Proof : Taking τE and vE1 as given, we can solve for all the other variables from labor
indiﬀerence, market clearing, free entry and budget balance. Indeed, defining:
f := φ
¡
θB
¢µ β
1− β y + τy + (1− τ)w
¶
,
we obtain (omitting superscripts):
p =
β
1− β
(1− τ) (w +Rv1) fγ−1
v1−γ1 [f − (1− τ) (w +Rv1)]
γ ,
u2 =
(1− τ) (w +Rv1)
f
, u1 = 1− u2, v2 = θBu2.
We then maximize the indirect utility function with respect to τE and vE1 , that is, given
that wE0 = wE1 = w, we solve:
max
τ,v
(1− τ) p−β,
given the expression found for p. The results follow from the first-order conditions. The
second-order conditions are easily verified.¥
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Observe that θ1 = 1−γγ
w
R is the optimal ratio v1/u1 that a firm maximizing pM1y −
(1− τ)wu1 − (1− τ)Rv1 would choose. One way to explain this fact is as follows. The
budget surplus can be split into two parts, as follows
[pM1y − (1− τ)wu1 − (1− τ)Rv1] + [τM2y − (1− τ)w (u2 −M2)] , orh
Apyθ1−γ1 u1 − (1− τ)Rθ1u1 − (1− τ)wu1
i
+
h
τyθ1−γ2 u2 − (1− τ)w
³
u2 − u2Aθ1−γ2
´i
.
which clearly distinguishes between revenues and expenditures by sector. For a fixed price,
the marginal budget surplus of a worker in each sector must be zero, for otherwise, by
holding fixed θi, i = 1, 2, but increasing ui in the sector i for which this marginal surplus is
positive, the government could increase its surplus while preserving the consumers’ utility,
a contradiction. As the second formulation emphasizes, however, each sector’s surplus is
linear in ui, so that marginal surplus equals average surplus, each term is zero, and the
optimal θ1 can then be determined by examining only pM1y − (1− τ)wu1 − (1− τ)Rv1.
Using this perspective, we can represent the determination of market tightness in Figure
2.1, where TR and TC (resp. MR and MC) denote total (resp. marginal) revenue and
cost, and subscripts F and G refer to the private firms and the government-managed firms,
respectively. The figure is drawn for the case in which employment in the public Sector 1
is smaller than employment in the corresponding private sector in the benchmark economy.
However, the opposite case may occur for a diﬀerent set of parameter values. The next
session discusses the model’s predictions.
3 Discussion
Our model yields two important results. First, we show that the comparison of unemploy-
ment rates in the partially public economy and in the all-private economy may go either
way, depending on the parameters. Second, our model predicts higher unemployment in the
European economy following a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of idiosyncratic
shock.
With respect to the first point, consider the eﬀect of ownership structure on the aggregate
employment rate. The aggregate employment rate in our model is a weighted average of
the probabilities of finding a job in the two sectors, E = u1φ (θ1) + (1− u1)φ (θ2). One
pleasing feature of the model is that the comparison of aggregate employment rates between
the benchmark economy and the European economy reduces to comparing the labor market
tightness in the public sector relative to the corresponding object in the private sector. In
fact, the results obtained in Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 imply that the labor market tightness
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in the benchmark economy is the same across sectors and it is also equal to the private
sector labor market tightness in the European economy. As a consequence, the diﬀerence
between the aggregate employment rate in the benchmark economy relative to the European
economy reduces to:
EB −EE = uE1
¡
φ
¡
θB
¢
− φ
¡
θE1
¢¢
.
Moreover, given the closed form solution for our model described in Lemmas 4 and 5, we find
that the diﬀerence between the private and the public labor market tightness is proportional
to:
θB − θE1 ;
µ
1− α
α
¶³αy
w
´
φB −
1− γ
γ
where φB < 1 is the probability that a worker finds a job in the private sector,which is
also the aggregate employment rate in the benchmark economy. A simple way to look at
this expression is to consider the case in which the workers’ share in the private sector α is
equivalent to their share in the matching function, i.e. α = γ. In this case the benchmark
economy has a higher unemployment rate than the European economy if workers are risk-
neutral, i.e. if the certainty equivalent w = αy. However, if workers are suﬃciently risk-
averse, that is if w is small enough, this inequality is reversed. This is due to the fact that
risk-averse workers are more willing to search in the public sector, which oﬀers insurance
against wage risk.
In general, the parameters α, γ, the vacancy cost R and the degree of risk aversion
r all determine the level of the private and public labor market tightness and, hence, are
important determinants of their comparison. For example, decreasing α reduces public
sector tightness but increases private sector tightness. In our model, the government faces
a trade-oﬀ between the (sunk) real cost and the (social) benefit of opening vacancies in the
state-controlled sector, where the social benefit corresponds to consumers’ welfare. Hence,
the lower the output share of the workers, the lower the benefit to the government for a
given measure of public vacancies. This entails that the labor market tightness in the
public sector and, therefore, employment in the European economy, is smaller as α is lower.
By contrast, labor market tightness in the private sector is determined by the free entry
condition. The expected profit of opening a vacancy is higher, given the measure of job
searchers, when the workers’ share is lower. Thus, the private sector tightness decreases in
α. As a consequence, a lower α may result in a lower market tightness in Sector 1 in Europe
with respect to the same sector in the benchmark economy and therefore, in lower total
employment in the European economy relative to the benchmark economy. The parameter
α may be interpreted as the worker’s “bargaining” power. Our result may, at first sight,
seem counterintuitive, because it is commonly thought that, given high unionization, an
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economy partially run by the government would have lower unemployment than an economy
with private ownership. However, that widely held view presumes that economies with large
public sectors also have a larger degree of unionization. In our model, the presumption does
not hold, because in our comparison α is the same for the two economies.
The second point to be noted is that an important prediction delivered by our model
relates to the eﬀect of an increase in economic turbulence on unemployment in the Euro-
pean economy. We model the increase in turbulence as a mean-preserving spread of the
distribution of output. The mean-preserving spread decreases the certainty equivalent w of
the private wage while leaving the expected output y unchanged. European employment
can be expressed as EE = φB + uE1
¡
φ
¡
θE1
¢
− φB
¢
. Since the mean-preserving spread does
not aﬀect expected output, the probability of finding a job in the private sector (φB), and
hence private sector tightness, remains unchanged. By contrast, the public sector tightness
decreases, due to two eﬀects of the turbulence: (i) more workers are induced to search for
a job in the public sector, which oﬀers security by providing a constant wage profile, and
(ii) fewer jobs are available in the public sector, because the government chooses to create
fewer vacancies. 6
Our model predicts an increase in both overall unemployment and, interestingly, public
employment after a mean-preserving spread when either one of the following conditions
holds before the spread: (1) if the public sector tightness is smaller than the private sector
tightness, and there is a suﬃciently small fraction of workers searching for a public job,
i.e. if 1 − u˜E1 > (1− γ)
³
1 + (1−φB)w˜φBy
´
,or (2) if the public sector tightness is larger than
the private sector tightness, and the fraction of workers searching for public jobs satisfies
1 < 1−u˜
E
1
1−γ
³
φBy
φBy+(1−φB)w˜
´
< φ(θ
E
1 )
φ
³
θ˜E1
´
−φB
,where ‘˜ ’is used to denote variables before the mean-
preserving spread.
Finally, it is interesting to note that following the mean-preserving spread, employment
remains the same in the benchmark economy. Hence, even if initially the unemployment
rate in the European economy is lower than in the benchmark economy, a large increase in
turbulence may reverse the ranking of unemployment rates.
It is also interesting to examine whether our result is related to the standard eﬃciency
results in search models (Hosios 1990). In a one-sector model, we know that if wages are too
high (α > γ), there will be too little job creation and hence too much unemployment. So in
a one-sector model, public ownership can give rise to either greater or less unemployment,
depending on the wage level in the decentralized economy. In order to check whether the
6See the closed form solution for our model presented in Lemma 5.
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Hosios condition holds in the two-sector model, consider the social planner’s problem, which
is to maximize U (c1, c2) by choosing (u1, θ1, θ2) subject to the resource constraints that the
consumption of each good is equal to the diﬀerence of the total production and the total
cost of creating vacancies, i.e. ci = ui [φ (θ1) y −Rθi] , i = 1, 2. The corresponding optimal
conditions are:
(u1) : Uc1 [φ (θ1) y −Rθ1]− Uc2 [φ (θ2) y −Rθ2] = 0
(θi) : uiUci
£
(1− γ) θ−1i φ (θi) y −R
¤
= 0 i = 1, 2
Thus, the social planner sets the same labor market tightness for both sectors equal to θ∗,
where:
(1− γ) q (θ∗) y = R
which is the same as the free entry condition when α = γ, that is, the labor market tightness
is the same across sectors and is equal to the corresponding value in the all-private economy.
Moreover, the optimal fraction of job searchers in Sector1, u∗1 = β, which is also the same
as in the all-private economy. Therefore, the Hosios condition holds in the two-sector
model as well. Note that the equilibrium for the partially-public (European) economy is
diﬀerent from the planner’s solution, because the government controls only one sector of
the economy.
4 Empirical Evidence
We now turn to the provision of empirical evidence in support of our theory. We begin
by motivating our modeling choices. In particular, we show how public employment is
quantitatively important in many countries and we document the increase in economic
turbulence over the period of interest. Then, we show that our model’s prediction is
consistent with the observation that those European countries that experienced the largest
increases in unemployment rates during the 1980s also experienced the largest increases in
public employment. In addition, we document the fact that countries characterized by a
larger presence of government in the economy tended to have lower employment rates and
to exhibit lower employment growth during the 1980s. Finally, we provide evidence in favor
of the theoretical finding that public sector workers are oﬀered the certainty equivalent of
the distribution of output. This is clearly an extreme case. The way to interpret this result
is in terms of a relative larger volatility of the private sector wage distribution. Empirical
studies show how the distribution of wages in the public sector is more compressed than in
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the private sector in many countries and how this diﬀerential grew during the 1980s and
early 1990s.
We use a complete definition of the public sector that includes both publicly operated
enterprises, and typical public sector activities, such as the provision of education, health
services, public security, and administrative services. Public enterprises are government-
owned or -controlled economic entities that generate most of their revenue by selling goods
and services. Other public sector activities, such as education, and health services, are
mostly financed from the government’s general revenue. In many European countries, the
government has a presence in commercial, industrial, and financial sectors of the economies
including banking, car manufacturing, airlines, telecommunications, postal services, oil ex-
traction, refinement and distribution. The government operates such enterprises either by
controlling these firms directly or by holding a majority of their shares.
As a consequence of this large and diverse set of public sector activities it is very diﬃcult
to find an inclusive and comparable cross-country measure of public employment. Countries
diﬀer in the structure of their government and degree of centralization, in their accounting
procedures and so forth. We use data from a 1997 OECD report to show how large
is the public sector and what is its variation across countries. To our knowledge this
report provides the best available data on employment in the public sector. Moreover, it
includes employment in public enterprises.7 Table 4.1 summarizes data on employment in
the limited public sector and in public enterprises as a fraction of total employment. The
limited public sector includes ministries and other services of (central and local) government,
education, health, and the army, as well as other activities that are financed primarily by
the government’s general revenue. The first column shows how the size of the limited public
sector is quite relevant and how it varies across countries. The limited public sector accounts
for around 20% of total employment in Italy and France. In the United States, government
employment accounts for around 14% of total employment. Scandinavian countries have
the largest governments, which account for more than 30% of total employment in both
Sweden and Denmark. The role of the government in the production sector also diﬀers
quite substantially across countries. Entries in the second column of Table 4.1 represent
the share of employment in public enterprises relative to total employment. This share is
almost negligible in the United States(0.7%) and Japan (0.5%), whereas it is a quantitatively
relevant part of total employment (above 4%) for many European countries. When we
7See the report “Measuring Public Employment in OECD countries: Sources, Methods, and Results”
(1997) for a detailed discussion of the national data sources. Data for diﬀerent countries are available for
diﬀerent years between 1993 and 1996.
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consider both components of public employment, the share of total employment due to
government employment ranges from 7% in Japan to more than 20% in many European
countries, including Italy (23.2%), France (27%) and the Scandinavian countries, where the
public sector constitutes 40% of total employment.
A second way to document the importance of government control over some sectors
of the economy is to use the indicator of state involvement in the economy developed
by Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999). This indicator is a component of a set of
indexes of product market regulation that have recently stimulated a number of papers (see,
for example, Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003), Blanchard and Philippon (2003), and Ebell and Haefke (2002)). Figure 4.1 plots
the index of state ownership for the subset of twenty countries considered in Table 4.1.
This index, which ranges between 1 and 6, is based on summary indexes of the scope and
size of public enterprises in the economy.8 This graph oﬀers a clear snapshot of cross-
country diﬀerences in public ownership in the late 1990s and shows that the extent of
public ownership in the economy is of relevance in many European countries, such as Italy,
France, Portugal, Finland and Greece.
It is important at this point to oﬀer a brief description of the market power of state-
owned enterprises and its evolution across countries. In many European countries the
presence of the state in the economy stems from historical factors. After WWII, govern-
ments wished to intervene in the national economy by establishing public enterprises. These
concerns resulted in a substantial presence of the state in a number of industrial, financial,
and commercial sectors of the economy, in addition to health and education.9 In most of
these countries the economic weight of these institutions did not change much during the
1980s and the early 1990s. Although a wave of privatization has been underway in Europe
since the 1980s, this process was significative only in Germany and the U.K. In other Eu-
ropean countries, such as France, Italy, and Spain, although discussion of the privatization
of state-owned concerns started in the early 1980s, the bulk of privatization only began in
8Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (1999) use this indicator, together with an index of interference in
private firms that summarizes information about the government special voting rights, and use of command
and control regulations, to build a summary index of State Control in the economy. See pp. 10-25 and
Tables A2.1.1 to A2.1.5 in the Appendix. The latter is, in turn, part of the more general index of product
market regulation.
9There are diﬀerent historical motivations for the emergence and evolution of public enterprises in many
European countries over the post-WWII period, for example, to provide basic services and infrastructure
and to support the employment level in the economy. See Toninelli (2000) for an extensive account of this
phenomenon in a selected number of countries (Italy, France, Germany, Spain, UK and the U.S.)
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the early 1990s. For instance, in Italy the state still owned four of Italy’s top-ten corporate
groups, and five of the top-ten individual businesses at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1996,
the state still owned more than fifty percent of Italy’s banks. Moreover, in the same year,
the state still had a statutory or de facto monopoly over basic phone services, gas import
and distribution, and cigarettes and tobacco. A similar picture emerges for Spain. In
1996, the total product of one of the three state holding companies accounted for more
than 7% of Spain’s GDP, and for about 10% of Spain’s industrial production (including
100% in aluminum).10 It is important to note here that our model takes the existence of
publicly operated enterprises as given. Although it is certainly interesting to explore how
these institutions emerged, the scope of this paper is simply to emphasize how the exist-
ing institutions aﬀect a country’s employment outcomes. Moreover, as argued above, the
extent of public ownership did not change substantially over our period of interest. This
is also documented in the work by Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003).
They show that the index of public ownership remained constant in France, Italy and Spain
between 1975 and the early 1990s.11
In the spirit of Ljungvist and Sargent (1998) we study the eﬀect of an increase in turbu-
lence in the economic environment since the 1970s on European unemployment. However,
we employ a diﬀerent mechanism. Whereas they focus on the role of unemployment in-
surance, we focus on the eﬀect of state control and the role that the government plays as
an employer. As a result of this diﬀerence in focus, we also model turbulence diﬀerently.
Whereas they model it as an increase in the probability that that a worker loses his or her
job, and therefore the skills associated with that job, we model it in a way that has wider
scope, as a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of output.
The increase in economic turbulence has been interpreted in a context-dependent way,
as an increase in the variability of a number of common aggregate shocks that hit the world
economy, starting in the early 1970s, but more accurately, it may be interpreted as an
increase in the variability in the occurrence and strength of a variety of possible shocks to
the world economy.
We now focus on the particular aspects of turbulence to hit the world economy, beginning
in the early 1970s. As argued in the 1994 OECD Job Study, the economic environment
became more turbulent as a consequence of the two oil price shocks of the early 1970s and
10See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce Reports, several years.
11See Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti and Schiantarelli (2003), Figure 3. The indicator is computed for seven
non-manufacturing industries: electricity and gas supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport,
post and telecommunications.
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of 1979/1980, the increase in the volatility of exchange rates due to the abandonment of the
Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime, and the waves of financial-market liberalization
and product market deregulation in the 1980s. Pervasive technological change, and the
trend toward globalization contributed to heighten this increase in turbulence even more.
Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994) provide evidence of this increase in economic instability. In
particular, they show that a large component of the widening of the earnings distribution in
the U.S. labor market during the 1980s was due to a sharp increase in the earnings instability
for individual workers. They show that one-third to a half of the increases in the variance of
earnings from the 1970s to the 1980s can be attributed to transitory movements in earnings.
More recently, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1998) used a formal model for earnings dynamics and
concluded that the increase in the variance of the transitory component accounts for half of
the total increase in the variance of individual male earnings over the period 1969-1991. A
similar pattern has also been observed in other countries. Dickens (2000) concludes that the
transitory component explains about half of the increase in earnings inequality in the U.K.
between 1975 and 1995. Baker and Solon (2003) report evidence that the increase in the
transitory component of earnings did also contribute to the increase in earnings inequality
in Canada. Cappellari (2002) reports a similar increase for Italy between 1983 and 1994.
Our assumption of a mean-preserving spread of the match-specific shock is meant to capture
this increase in the instability of wages.
Next we document that, consistent with the predictions of our model, countries that
experienced the largest growth in unemployment over the 1980s also had the largest increases
in public sector employment. Figure 4.2 plots the change in unemployment rate between the
early 1970s and the early 1990s against the change in public sector employment (expressed
as a percentage of total employment) for the subset of OECD countries for which comparable
time series data are available. Data on public employment in 1970 and in 1990 are from the
OECD, Historical Statistics. Data on standardized unemployment rates are from Nickell,
Nunziata, and Ochel (2002). They refer to the average standardized unemployment rate over
the 1965-1972 and 1988-1995 time periods.12 The figures only include employment in the
limited public sector, because data on employment in public enterprises in the 1970s are not
available. Panel A reports the actual values for the percentage diﬀerence in unemployment
rates and the percentage change in public employment rates between the two periods. Panel
B presents data on the ranking of countries along the two dimensions. The figures show
that there is a positive cross-country correlation between the two variables. The Spearman
12See Table 1 in Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2002) for the data sources. The authors use OECD stan-
dardized unemployment rates whenever possible.
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rank correlation between the two series is equal to 0.49 and is significant at the 5% level.
It might be thought that this positive cross-country correlation is simply due to the fact
that in some of these countries, aggregate employment declined disproportionately more
and not by a genuine (relative) increase in the number of public sector employees. However,
we find similar results when we measure public employment as a fraction of the labor force.
In this case the Spearman rank correlation between the two series is equal to 0.40 and is
significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with the prediction of our model that, for
some parameters, overall unemployment and public employment increase simultaneously as
the economy becomes more turbulent.
Additional evidence in favor of our model’s predictions is provided by Nicoletti, et. al
(2001), who show, in particular, that there is a negative correlation between the degree
of public ownership and employment across countries and that countries characterized by
a larger share of state ownership also experienced the lowest employment growth between
1982 and 1995. They find that the (simple) cross-country correlation between employment
rate in 1995 (in the non-agricultural business sector) and the index of public ownership
is equal to -0.71 and significant at the 10% level. Moreover, they also show that this
index has a negative relationship with employment growth between 1982 and 1995 (-.44).13
Such a negative relationship is robust to the inclusion of other factors in the regression
analysis. Further evidence of this negative relationship is provided by Algan, Cahuc, and
Zylberberg (2002), who show how public employment may have a crowding out eﬀect on
total employment in those countries where the public goods produced are substitutes for
private sector goods. This finding is consistent with ours as the goods produced by the two
sectors are substitutes in the model.
A number of empirical studies support the finding that the earnings dispersion for the
public sector is larger than that for the private sector. These studies examine how diﬀerent
sectors of employment aﬀect diﬀerent measures of the distribution of earnings for a subset of
countries. They conclude that, in all countries considered, there exists a more compressed
wage distribution in the public sector.14 Borjas (2002) documents that whereas U.S.
wage inequality in the private sector widened substantially over the past two decades, the
distribution in the public sector has remained relatively more stable He finds that the
dispersion of the log weekly wage distribution for men in the private sector, as measured
13As a term of comparison, the index of employment protection legislation has a correlation of -0.61 with
employment rate in 1995 and of -0.45 with the growth in employment rate between 1982 and 1995.
14See Gregory and Borland (1999) for a review.
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by the 90th to 10th percentile, is equal to 1.3 log points for 1975 when the corresponding
figure for public sector employees is equal to 1.1. By 2000, inequality had increased to 1.7
in the private sector and 1.28 in the public sector. Gosling and Disney (1998) finds similar
results for the U.K. over the period 1983 to the mid-1990s. The volatility of earnings in the
public sector, as measured by the 90th to 10th percentile ratio of weekly earnings, increased
from 2.82 to 2.86, whereas the volatility in the private sector increased from 3.05 to 3.32.
Cappellari (2002) show that a similar pattern may also be observed in Italy. He also shows
that between 1983 and 1994 the transitory component of earnings was almost zero in the
public sector, whereas it was positive and increasing in the private sector. This is consistent
with the evidence reported above for the increase in the volatility of earnings and provides
additional support for our argument. In fact, our model predicts that following an increase
in turbulence the volatility in the public sector is unchanged, whereas it increases in the
private sector. Finally, an empirical study by Jurges (2002) documents that in Germany,
the wage distribution in the public sector is generally less dispersed than in the private
sector.
To conclude, we see this paper as a simple theoretical contribution to the literature that
tries to explain the large and persistent increase in European unemployment between the
1970s and the 1990s. In particular, we develop a model that provides insights into one
possible mechanism through which the presence of a very active government in the economy
may aﬀect its labor market performance. We also present suggestive empirical evidence
that shows that such a mechanism may have contributed to the increase in European un-
employment over this time period.
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Table 4.1: Employment in the “limited” public sector and in public enterprises
(percentage of total employment)
Employment in Employment in
Public Sector Public Enterprises
Australia 14.6 4.1
Austria 15.8 6.7
Belgium 20 3.9
Canada 17.4 2.5
Denmark 35.4 3.9
Finland 25.1 2.1
France 20.2 6.8
Germany 14.1 1.3
Greece 9.6 3.3
Ireland 16.8 4.3
Italy 18.2 5
Japan 6.5 0.5
Netherlands 11.8 2.1
New Zealand 12.1 2.1
Portugal 14.8 2.7
Spain 15.1 2.9
Sweden 31.7 6.4
Turkey 9.4 2.7
United Kingdom 11.9 5
United States 14.2 0.7
Data Source: “Measuring Public Employment in OECD Countries:
Sources, Methods, and Results”, OECD Report 1997
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Figure 4.1: Cross-country differences in Public Ownership 
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 Panel A:  Values (in percentage)
 Panel B: Cross country rankings
Figure 4.2: Percentage Differences in Public Employment and in Unemployment, 1970-1990
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5 Appendix: The model with a general utility specification
Assume that the utility function U : R2++ → R is smooth, jointly strictly concave and
strictly increasing in both parameters. Job-searchers and vacancies in both sectors are
matched through an homogenous of degree one matching function. That is, in each sector
i = 1, 2 the number of matches Mi can be written as Aiu
γi
i v
1−γi
i , γi ∈ (0, 1) where ui is
the measure of searchers in sector i while vi is the measure of vacancies posted in sector
i. This parametric assumption is hereafter referred to as CD. Let γi = γ, i = 1, 2, just as
Ai = A, i = 1, 2, Yi = Y a.s., i = 1, 2, and αi = α, i = 1, 2, where Yi is (the distribution
of) the output in sector i of a firm (identified with the output of a match) and αi ∈ (0, 1)
is the share of realized output given to the worker. A is a parameter that is small enough
so as to guarantee that matching probabilities for searchers and vacancies are well-defined.
That is, the production technologies are the same across sectors, an assumption hereafter
referred to as IT. The cost of opening a vacancy is R > 0. The market tightness in sector
i = 1, 2, is the ratio of vacancies to searchers in that sector: θi = vi/ui. We denote the
proportional tax rate by τ , the relative price of good 1 by p, the wage in sector i = 1, 2 by
wi and the unemployment benefit by w0. Superscripts B and E refer to the benchmark and
the European economy, respectively.
The proof goes as follows. Lemma 1 establishes that the relative price of good 1 in
the benchmark economy is 1. This implies that comparing employment rates EB and EE
between the two economies boils down to comparing the market tightness of the first sector
across economies (Lemma 2). Lemma 3 shows that workers are completely “insured” in
Europe, that is, workers are indiﬀerent between being unemployed and working in either
sector. Using this result, Lemma 4 determines the values of the relevant market tightnesses.
In what follows, ZP refers to the zero profit condition in the private sector(s) and LI (labor
indiﬀerence) refers to the restriction that searchers are indiﬀerent across sectors.
The next lemma shows that CD and IT imply that the relative price in the U.S. economy
is 1.
Lemma 6 pS = 1.
Proof. Let p stand for pB in what follows in this proof. From the zero profit condition
(hereafter ZP) and CD, we get that:
θ1
θ2
= p1/γ
Therefore, because searchers are indiﬀerent across sectors (hereafter LI):
p
1−γ
γ [Ev ((1− τ)αpY, p)− v ((1− τ)w0, p)] = [Ev ((1− τ)αY, p)− v ((1− τ)w0, p)] ,
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where v (·) is the consumer’s indirect utility function. If the R.H.S. is zero, then so must
be the L.H.S., so that
Ev ((1− τ)αpY, p) = v ((1− τ)w0, p) = Ev ((1− τ)αY, p) ,
and therefore p = 1. If the L.H.S. is nonzero, then the right hand side is not either. In
particular, both must be strictly positive for workers to actively search. Notice then that
for p > 1, p
1−γ
γ > 1 and Ev ((1− τ)αpY, p) > Ev ((1− τ)αY, p) imply that the equality
cannot hold, and a similar reasoning applies for p < 1. The equality trivially holding for
p = 1 therefore implies that this is the unique solution.
The second lemma shows that CD and IT imply that comparing (un)employment rates
boils down to comparing market tightnesses of the first sector across economies.
Lemma 7 EE > ES iﬀ θS1 > θE2
Proof. Observe that total employment E satisfies:
E = M1 +M2
= φ (θ2) + u1 (φ (θ1)− φ (θ2)) ,
where φ (θ) is the probability that a job searcher is matched with a vacancy given market
tightness θ. So
EE −EB = uE1
¡
φ
¡
θE1
¢
− φ
¡
θE2
¢¢
,
since θB1 = θB2 = θE2 by ZP.
The remainder of the appendix focuses on the European economy and superscripts are
accordingly dropped. The next lemma shows that the wage in the public sector is the
certainty equivalent of the (risky) wage in the private sector, and that the unemployment
benefit completely insures searchers.15 Because the government is risk-neutral and workers
are risk-averse, the optimal unemployment benefits and public wage are fixed numbers
rather than lotteries. Similarly, the government can always decrease the spread between
this public wage and the unemployment benefit in a way that both increases welfare and
decreases the government’s expenditures. (However, the proof is a little more involved than
this intuition suggests, because it is typically not possible to only change those two variables
while keeping searchers indiﬀerent across sectors).
15Note that introducing a disutility of working merely amounts to introducing a wedge between the
unemployment benefit and the certainty equivalent of the wage in either sector, without changing the full
insurance result.
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Lemma 8 For given p and τ , w0 = w1 = w, where Ev ((1− τ)w2, p) = v ((1− τ)w, p)
Proof. Fix p > 0 throughout and let ωi = (1− τ)wi i = 0, 1, 2. For sake of contradiction
suppose not, that is w0 < w1 and therefore w0 < w (by LI). Without loss of generality (we
reverse the role of indices in what follows otherwise) we assume that:
M1vp (ω1, p) + (u1 −M1) vp (ω0, p)
u1
≥ M2E [vp (ω2, p)] + (u2 −M2) vp (ω0, p)
u2
,
where vw and vp are the derivatives of v with respect to w and p. Define then ∆ω1∆ such
that :
M1
u1
vw (ω1, p)
∆ω1
∆
+
(u1 −M1)
u1
vw (ω0, p) = 0. (∗)
Then given that v is strictly concave we have that:
M1
u1
∆ω1
∆
+
(u1 −M1)
u1
< 0.
Next, for ∆p∆ < 0, define
∆ω2
∆ such that :
M1
u1
vw (ω1, p)
∆ω1
∆
+
(u1 −M1)
u1
vw (ω0, p) (∗∗)
+
µ
M1vp (ω1, p) + (u1 −M1) vp (ω0, p)
u1
¶
∆p
∆
=
M2
u2
E [vw (ω2, p)]
∆ω2
∆
+
(u2 −M2)
u2
vw (ω0, p)
+
µ
M2E [vp (ω2, p)] + (u2 −M2) vp (ω0, p)
u2
¶
∆p
∆
.
Notice that Government controls the random variable ω2 downwards through the tax rate
τ . Since by assumption the last term on the L.H.S. is smaller than the last term on the
R.H.S., and the first terms on the L.H.S. sum to zero it must be that:
M2
u2
E [vw (ω2, p)]
∆ω2
∆
+
(u2 −M2)
u2
vw (ω0, p) < 0.
Then given that v is strictly concave we have that:
M2
u2
∆ω2
∆
+
(u2 −M2)
u2
< 0.
Define finally ∆p∆ by:
M1
u1
∆ω1
∆
+
(u1 −M1)
u1
+
M2
u2
∆ω2
∆
+
(v2 −M2)
u2
=M1Y
∆p
∆
, (∗ ∗ ∗)
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and observe that by construction it is indeed negative. To conclude the proof it remains
to observe that by Taylor’s theorem there exists a suﬃciently small ∆ > 0 in the net
unemployment benefits ω0 and corresponding changes ∆p, ∆ω1, and ∆ω2 such that LI
and Budget Balance (hereafter, BB) are maintained while welfare increases. (∗) , (∗∗) , and
(∗ ∗ ∗) imply that worker searching in sector 1 are better oﬀ from the change, and (∗∗)
implies that LI is maintained (which in turn implies that workers searching in sector 2 are
also better oﬀ). Finally, (∗ ∗ ∗) implies that the budget remains balanced.
The final lemma provides closed-form solutions for the two relevant market tightnesses.
The market tightness for the public sector is slightly more complicated to determine than
for the private sector. The idea is as follows. Given the relative price of good 1, the gross
income of a worker in the private sector is determined, and cannot be influenced by the
government. This gross income pins also down the gross income of unemployed workers
and of workers in the public sector, given the previous lemma. Given a relative price and
the consumer’s gross income, the indirect utility function of a consumer decreases in the
tax rate. Therefore, to maximize welfare, for a given relative price, the government should
minimize the tax rate. In particular, this implies that, at the optimum, the government
cannot, by changing u1 or v1, increase its surplus, for otherwise it could have chosen a lower
tax rate. Therefore, holding the price fixed, the derivatives with respect to u1 and v1 of the
budget surplus should be zero, which, along with budget balance, pins down the market
tightness. However, the price may change as u1 and v1 change, and this price change has
two eﬀects on welfare: one positive, because it is likely to decrease the relative price of
good 1, one negative, because to oﬀset this loss in budget revenue, the government needs to
increase the tax rate to balance the budget. If consumer’s utility function displays constant
elasticity of substitution between the two goods, these two eﬀects cancel each other.
Lemma 9 θ1 = 1−γγ
w
R ±σ, and θ2 =
³
A(1−α)Y
R
´1/γ
, where σ = 0 with constant elasticity
of substitution.
Proof. θ2 is easily found from ZP. Using the previous lemma, we write w0, w1 and w
interchangeably. Observe that the government can dissipate any surplus without changing
the price by increasing suﬃciently the net unemployment benefits ω0 and reducing the
tax rate in the amount necessary to maintain labor indiﬀerence. Such a change would
unambiguously improve welfare. As a consequence, at the optimum, the government cannot
change u1 nor v1 in such a way as to create a surplus (Notice that u1 and v1 do not aﬀect
welfare directly). Therefore, if we write BB as f (u1, v1) = 0 for some f , it must be that
df(u1,v1)
du1 = 0 and
df(u1,v1)
dv1 = 0 at the optimal values (u1, v1). Holding the price fixed, we
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have therefore:
(1−M2) (1− τ)w + (1− τ)Rv1 = pM1Y +
τ
1− αRv2,
where M2 = (1− u1)Aθ1−γ2 , M1 = u1Aθ
1−γ
1 , u2 = (1− u1) θ2 (We used ZP to rewrite
budget balance). In addition:
pM1Y =
(1− τ)Rv1
1− γ
(1− τ)M2w = γ pM1Y
1− u1
u1
− τRv2
1− α.
Substituting back into the budget constraint yields that θ1 = 1−γγ
w
R . Changing u1 and
v1 may aﬀect the price however, which aﬀects both the welfare (the consumer’s indirect
utility function is decreasing the price) directly, and indirectly through the tax rate that
adjusts to balance the budget. We summarize this eﬀect by σ, which may be either positive
or negative. When the utility function exhibits constant elasticity of substitution, it is
straightforward to compute the optimal choices and verify that σ = 0.
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